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Abstract. Due to Shor’s algorithm, quantum computers are a severe
threat for public key cryptography. This motivated the cryptographic
community to search for quantum-safe solutions. On the other hand, the
impact of quantum computing on secret key cryptography is much less
understood. In this paper, we consider attacks where an adversary can
query an oracle implementing a cryptographic primitive in a quantum
superposition of different states. This model gives a lot of power to the
adversary, but recent results show that it is nonetheless possible to build
secure cryptosystems in it.
We study applications of a quantum procedure called Simon’s algorithm
(the simplest quantum period finding algorithm) in order to attack sym-
metric cryptosystems in this model. Following previous works in this
direction, we show that several classical attacks based on finding colli-
sions can be dramatically sped up using Simon’s algorithm: finding a
collision requires Ω(2n/2) queries in the classical setting, but when colli-
sions happen with some hidden periodicity, they can be found with only
O(n) queries in the quantum model.
We obtain attacks with very strong implications. First, we show that
the most widely used modes of operation for authentication and authen-
ticated encryption (e.g. CBC-MAC, PMAC, GMAC, GCM, and OCB)
are completely broken in this security model. Our attacks are also appli-
cable to many CAESAR candidates: CLOC, AEZ, COPA, OTR, POET,
OMD, and Minalpher. This is quite surprising compared to the situa-
tion with encryption modes: Anand et al. show that standard modes are
secure with a quantum-secure PRF.
Second, we show that Simon’s algorithm can also be applied to slide at-
tacks, leading to an exponential speed-up of a classical symmetric crypt-
analysis technique in the quantum model.
Keywords: post-quantum cryptography, symmetric cryptography, quan-
tum attacks, block ciphers, modes of operation, slide attack.
1 Introduction
The goal of post-quantum cryptography is to prepare cryptographic primitives
to resist quantum adversaries, i.e. adversaries with access to a quantum com-
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puter. Indeed, cryptography would be particularly affected by the development of
large-scale quantum computers. While currently used asymmetric cryptographic
primitives would suffer from devastating attacks due to Shor’s algorithm [42],
the status of symmetric ones is not so clear: generic attacks, which define the
security of ideal symmetric primitives, would get a quadratic speed-up thanks
to Grover’s algorithm [23], hinting that doubling the key length could restore an
equivalent ideal security in the post-quantum world. Even though the commu-
nity seems to consider the issue settled with this solution [6], only very little is
known about real world attacks, that determine the real security of used primi-
tives. Very recently, this direction has started to draw attention, and interesting
results have been obtained. New theoretical frameworks to take into account
quantum adversaries have been developed [11,12,19,22,15,2].
Simon’s algorithm [43] is central in quantum algorithm theory. Historically, it
was an important milestone in the discovery by Shor of his celebrated quantum
algorithm to solve integer factorization in polynomial time [42]. Interestingly,
Simon’s algorithm has also been applied in the context of symmetric cryptog-
raphy. It was first used to break the 3-round Feistel construction [30] and then
to prove that the Even-Mansour construction [31] is insecure with superposition
queries. While Simon’s problem (which is the problem solved with Simon’s algo-
rithm) might seem artificial at first sight, it appears in certain constructions in
symmetric cryptography, in which ciphers and modes typically involve a lot of
structure.
These first results, although quite striking, are not sufficient for evaluating the
security of actual ciphers. Indeed, the confidence we have on symmetric ciphers
depends on the amount of cryptanalysis that was performed on the primitive.
Only this effort allows researchers to define the security margin which measures
how far the construction is from being broken. Thanks to the large and always
updated cryptanalysis toolbox built over the years in the classical world, we
have solid evaluations of the security of the primitives against classical adver-
saries. This is, however, no longer the case in the post-quantum world, i.e. when
considering quantum adversaries.
We therefore need to build a complete cryptanalysis toolbox for quantum
adversaries, similar to what has been done for the classical world. This is a
fundamental step in order to correctly evaluate the post-quantum security of
current ciphers and to design new secure ciphers for the post-quantum world.
Our results. We make progresses in this direction, and open new surprising
and important ranges of applications for Simon’s algorithm in symmetric cryp-
tography:
1. The original formulation of Simon’s algorithm is for functions whose colli-
sions happen only at some hidden period. We extend it to functions that
have more collisions. This leads to a better analysis of previous applications
of Simon’s algorithm in symmetric cryptography.
2. We then show an attack against the LRW construction, used to turn a block-
cipher into a tweakable block cipher [32]. Like the results on 3-round Feistel
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and Even-Mansour, this is an example of construction with provable security
in the classical setting that becomes insecure against a quantum adversary.
3. Next, we study block cipher modes of operation. We show that some of
the most common modes for message authentication and authenticated en-
cryption are completely broken in this setting. We describe forgery attacks
against standardized modes (CBC-MAC, PMAC, GMAC, GCM, and OCB),
and against several CAESAR candidates, with complexity only O(n), where
n is the size of the block. In particular, this partially answers an open ques-
tion by Boneh and Zhandry [13]: “Do the CBC-MAC or NMAC constructions
give quantum-secure PRFs?”.
Those results are in stark contrast with a recent analysis of encryption
modes in the same setting: Anand et al. show that some classical encryption
modes are secure against a quantum adversary when using a quantum-secure
PRF [3]. Our results imply that some authentication and authenticated en-
cryption schemes remain insecure with any block cipher.
4. The last application is a quantization of slide attacks, a popular family of
cryptanalysis that is independent of the number of rounds of the attacked
cipher. Our result is the first exponential speed-up obtained directly by a
quantization of a classical cryptanalysis technique, with complexity dropping
from O(2n/2) to O(n), where n is the size of the block.
These results imply that for the symmetric primitives we analyze, doubling the
key length is not sufficient to restore security against quantum adversaries. A sig-
nificant effort on quantum cryptanalysis of symmetric primitives is thus crucial
for our long-term trust in these cryptosystems.
The attack model. We consider attacks against classical cryptosystems us-
ing quantum resources. This general setting broadly defines the field of post-
quantum cryptography. But attacking specific cryptosystems requires a more
precise definition of the operations the adversary is allowed to perform. The
simplest setting allows the adversary to perform local quantum computation.
For instance, this can be modeled by the quantum random oracle model, in
which the adversary can query the oracle in an arbitrary superposition of the
inputs [11,14,48,44]. A more practical setting allows quantum queries to the hash
function used to instantiate the oracle on a quantum computer.
We consider here a much stronger model in which, in addition to local quan-
tum operations, an adversary is granted an access to a possibly remote cryp-
tographic oracle in superposition of the inputs, and obtains the corresponding
superposition of outputs. In more detail, if the encryption oracle is described
by a classical function Ok : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n, then the adversary can make
standard quantum queries |x〉|y〉 7→ |x〉|Ok(x)⊕ y〉, where x and y are arbitrary
n-bit strings and |x〉, |y〉 are the corresponding n-qubit states expressed in the
computational basis. A circuit representing the oracle is given in Figure 1. More-
over, any superposition
∑
x,y λx,y|x〉|y〉 is a valid input to the quantum oracle,
who then returns
∑
x,y λx,y|x〉|y⊕Ok(x)〉. In previous works, these attacks have
been called superposition attacks [19], quantum chosen message attacks [13] or
quantum security [47].
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|0〉
|x〉
Ok
|x〉
|Ok(x)〉
Fig. 1. The quantum cryptographic oracle.
Simon’s algorithm requires the preparation of the uniform superposition of
all n-bit strings, 1√
2n
∑
x |x〉|0〉4. For this input, the quantum encryption oracle
returns 1√
2n
∑
x |x〉|Ok(x)〉, the superposition of all possible pairs of plaintext-
ciphertext. It might seem at first that this model gives an overwhelming power
to the adversary and is therefore uninteresting. Note, however, that the laws of
quantum mechanics imply that the measurement of such a 2n-qubit state can
only reveal 2n bits of information, making this model nontrivial.
The simplicity of this model, together with the fact that it encompasses any
reasonable model of quantum attacks makes it very interesting. For instance, [12]
gave constructions of message authenticated codes that remain secure against
superposition attacks. A similar approach was initiated by [19], who showed
how to construct secure multiparty protocols when an adversary can corrupt
the parties in superposition. A protocol that is proven secure in this model may
truthfully be used in a quantum world.
Our work shows that superposition attacks, although they are not trivial,
allow new powerful strategies for the adversary. Modes of operation that are
provably secure against classical attacks can then be broken. There exist a few
options to prevent the attacks that we present here. A possibility is to forbid all
kind of quantum access to a cryptographic oracle. In a world where quantum
resources become available, this restriction requires a careful attention. This can
be achieved for example by performing a quantum measurement of any incom-
ing quantum query to the oracle. But this task involves meticulous engineering
of quantum devices whose outcome remains uncertain. Even information theo-
retically secure quantum cryptography remains vulnerable to attacks on their
implementations, as shown by attacks on quantum key distribution [49,34,45].
A more realistic approach is to develop a set of protocols that remains secure
against superposition attacks. Another advantage of this approach is that it also
covers more advanced scenarios, for example when an encryption device is given
to the adversary as an obfuscated algorithm. Our work shows how important it
is to develop protocols that remain secure against superposition attacks.
Regarding symmetric cryptanalysis, we have already mentioned the proto-
col of Boneh and Zhandry for MACs that remains secure against superposi-
tion attacks. In particular, we answer negatively to their question asking wether
CBC-MAC is secure in their model. Generic quantum attacks against symmetric
cryptosystems have also been considered. For instance, [27] studies the security
of iterated block ciphers, and Anand et al. investigated the security of various
4 When there is no ambiguity, we write |0〉 for the state |0 . . . 0〉 of appropriate length.
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modes of operations for encryption against superposition attacks [3]. They show
that OFB and CTR remain secure, while CBC and CFB are not secure in general
(with attacks involving Simon’s algorithm), but are secure if the underlying PRF
is quantum secure. Recently, [28] considers symmetric families of cryptanalysis,
describing quantum versions of differential and linear attacks.
Cryptographic notions like indistinguishability or semantic security are well
understood in a classical world. However, they become difficult to formalize when
considering quantum adversaries. The quantum chosen message model is a good
framework to study these [22,15,2].
In this paper, we consider forgery attacks: the goal of the attacker is to
forge a tag for some arbitrary message, without the knowledge of the secret key.
In a quantum setting, we follow the EUF-qCMA security definition that was
given by Boneh and Zhandry [12]. A message authentication code is broken by a
quantum existential forgery attack if after q queries to the cryptographic oracle,
the adversary can generate at least q+1 valid messages with corresponding tags.
Organization. The paper is organized as follows. First, Section 2 introduces Si-
mon’s algorithm and explains how to modify it in order to handle functions that
only approximately satisfy Simon’s promise. This variant seems more appropri-
ate for symmetric cryptography and may be of independent interest. Section 3
summarizes known quantum attacks against various constructions in symmetric
cryptography. Section 4 presents the attack against the LRW constructions. In
Section 5, we show how Simon’s algorithm can be used to obtain devastating
attacks on several widely used modes of operations: CBC-MAC, PMAC, GMAC,
GCM, OCB, as well as several CAESAR candidates. Section 6 shows the appli-
cation of the algorithm to slide attacks, providing an exponential speed-up. The
paper ends in Section 7 with a conclusion, pointing out possible new directions
and applications.
2 Simon’s algorithm and attack strategy
In this section, we present Simon’s problem [43] and the quantum algorithm
for efficiently solving it. The simplest version of our attacks directly exploits
this algorithm in order to recover some secret value of the encryption algorithm.
Previous works have already considered such attacks against 3-round Feistel
schemes and the Even-Mansour construction (see Section 3 for details).
Unfortunately, it is not always possible to recast an attack in terms of Simon’s
problem. More precisely, Simon’s problem is a promise problem, and in many
cases, the relevant promise (that only a structured class of collisions can occur)
is not satisfied, far from it in fact. We show in Theorem 1 below that, however,
these additional collisions do not lead to a significant increase of the complexity
of our attacks.
2.1 Simon’s problem and algorithm
We first describe Simon’s problem, and then the quantum algorithm for solving it.
We refer the reader to the recent review by Montanaro and de Wolf on quantum
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property testing for various applications of this algorithm [37]. We assume here
a basic knowledge of the quantum circuit model. We denote the addition and
multiplication in a field with 2n elements by “⊕” and “·”, respectively.
We consider that the access to the input of Simon’s problem, a function
f , is made by querying it. A classical query oracle is a function x 7→ f(x).
To run Simon’s algorithm, it is required that the function f can be queried
quantum-mechanically. More precisely, it is supposed that the algorithm can
make arbitrary quantum superpositions of queries of the form |x〉|0〉 7→ |x〉|f(x)〉.
Simon’s problem is the following:
Simon’s problem: Given a Boolean function f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n and
the promise that there exists s ∈ {0, 1}n such that for any (x, y) ∈ {0, 1}n,
[f(x) = f(y)]⇔ [x⊕ y ∈ {0n, s}], the goal is to find s.
This problem can be solved classically by searching for collisions. The opti-
mal time to solve it is therefore Θ(2n/2). On the other hand, Simon’s algorithm
solves this problem with quantum complexity O(n). Recall that the Hadamard
transform H⊗n applied on an n-qubit state |x〉 for some x ∈ {0, 1}n gives
H⊗n|x〉 = 1√
2n
∑
y∈{0,1}n(−1)x·y|y〉, where x · y := x1y1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ xnyn.
The algorithm repeats the following five quantum steps.
1. Starting with a 2n-qubit state |0〉|0〉, one applies a Hadamard transform
H⊗n to the first register to obtain the quantum superposition
1√
2n
∑
x∈{0,1}n
|x〉|0〉.
2. A quantum query to the function f maps this to the state
1√
2n
∑
x∈{0,1}n
|x〉|f(x)〉.
3. Measuring the second register in the computational basis yields a value f(z)
and collapses the first register to the state:
1√
2
(|z〉+ |z ⊕ s〉).
4. Applying again the Hadamard transform H⊗n to the first register gives:
1√
2
1√
2n
∑
y∈{0,1}n
(−1)y·z (1 + (−1)y·s) |y〉.
5. The vectors y such that y ·s = 1 have amplitude 0. Therefore, measuring the
state in the computational basis yields a random vector y such that y · s = 0.
By repeating this subroutine O(n) times, one obtains n− 1 independent vectors
orthogonal to s with high probability, and s can be recovered using basic linear
algebra. Theorem 1 gives the trade-off between the number of repetitions of the
subroutine and the success probability of the algorithm.
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2.2 Dealing with unwanted collisions
In our cryptanalysis scenario, it is not always the case that the promise of Simon’s
problem is perfectly satisfied. More precisely, by construction, there will always
exist an s such that f(x) = f(x ⊕ s) for any input x, but there might be many
more collisions than those of this form. If the number of such unwanted collisions
is too large, one might not be able to obtain a full rank linear system of equations
from Simon’s subroutine after O(n) queries. Theorem 1 rules this out provided
that f does not have too many collisions of the form f(x) = f(x ⊕ t) for some
t 6∈ {0, s}.
For f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n such that f(x⊕ s) = f(x) for all x, consider
ε(f, s) = max
t∈{0,1}n\{0,s}
Prx[f(x) = f(x⊕ t)]. (1)
This parameter quantifies how far the function is from satisfying Simon’s promise.
For a random function, one expects ε(f, s) = Θ(n2−n), following the analysis
of [18]. On the other hand, for a constant function, ε(f, s) = 1 and it is impossible
to recover s.
The following theorem, whose proof can be found in Appendix A, shows the
effect of unwanted collisions on the success probability of Simon’s algorithm.
Theorem 1 (Simon’s algorithm with approximate promise). If ε(f, s) ≤
p0 < 1, then Simon’s algorithm returns s with cn queries, with probability at least
1− (2(1+p02 )c)n.
In particular, choosing c ≥ 3/(1 − p0) ensures that the error decreases ex-
ponentially with n. To apply our results, it is therefore sufficient to prove that
ε(f, s) is bounded away from 1.
Finally, if we apply Simon’s algorithm without any bound on ε(f, s), we can
not always recover s unambiguously. Still if we select a random value t orthogonal
to all vectors ui returned by each step of the algorithm, t satisfy f(x⊕ t) = f(x)
with high probability.
Theorem 2 (Simon’s algorithm without promise). After cn steps of Si-
mon’s algorithm, if t is orthogonal to all vectors ui returned by each step of the
algorithm, then Prx[f(x⊕t) = f(t)] ≥ p0 with probability at least 1−
(
2
(
1+p0
2
)c)n
.
In particular, choosing c ≥ 3/(1 − p0) ensures that the probability is expo-
nentially close to 1.
2.3 Attack strategy
The general strategy behind our attacks exploiting Simon’s algorithm is to start
with the encryption oracle Ek : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n and exhibit a new function f
that satisfies Simon’s promise with two additional properties: the adversary
should be able to query f in superposition if he has quantum oracle access to Ek,
and the knowledge of the string s should be sufficient to break the cryptographic
scheme. In the following, this function is called Simon’s function.
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In most cases, our attacks correspond to a classical collision attack. In particu-
lar, the value s will usually be the difference in the internal state after processing
a fixed pair of messages (α0, α1), i.e. s = E(α0)⊕E(α1). The input of f will be
inserted into the state with the difference s so that f(x) = f(x⊕ s).
In our work, this function f is of the form:
f1 : x 7→ P (E˜(x) + E˜(x⊕ s)) or,
f2 : b, x 7→
{
E˜(x) if b = 0,
E˜(x⊕ s) if b = 1,
where E˜ is a simple function obtained from Ek and P a permutation. It is
immediate to see that f1 and f2 have periods s for f1 or 1||s for f2.
In most applications, Simon’s function satisfies f(x) = f(y) for y ⊕ x ∈
{0, s}, but also for additional inputs x, y. Theorem 1 extends Simon’s algorithm
precisely to this case. In particular, if the additional collisions of f are random,
then Simon’s algorithm is successful. When considering explicit constructions,
we can not in general prove that the unwanted collisions are random, but rather
that they look random enough. In practice, if the function ε(f, s) is not bounded,
then some of the primitives used in the construction have are far from ideal. We
can show that this happens with low probability, and would imply an classical
attack against the system. Applying Theorem 1 is not trivial, but it stretches
the range of application of Simon’s algorithm far beyond its original version.
Construction of Simon’s functions. To make our attacks as clear as possible,
we provide the diagrams of circuits computing the function f . These circuits use
a little number of basic building blocks represented in Figure 2.
In our attacks, we often use a pair of arbitrary constants α0 and α1. The
choice of the constant is indexed by a bit b. We denote by Uα the gate that maps
b to αb (See Figure 2.1). For simplicity, we ignore here the additional qubits
required in practice to make the transform reversible through padding.
Although it is well known that arbitrary quantum states cannot be cloned,
we use the CNOT gate to copy classical information. More precisely, a CNOT
gate can copy states in the computational basis: CNOT : |x〉|0〉 → |x〉|x〉. This
transform is represented in Figure 2.2.
Finally, any unitary transform U can be controlled by a bit b. This operation,
denoted U b maps x to U(x) if b = 1 and leaves x unchanged otherwise. In the
quantum setting, the qubit |b〉 can be in a superposition of 0 and 1, resulting in
a superposition of |x〉 and |U(x)〉. The attacks that we present in the following
sections only make use of this procedure when the attacker knows a classical
description of the unitary to be controlled. In particular, we do not apply it to
the cryptographic oracle.
When computing Simon’s function, i.e. the function f on which Simon’s algo-
rithm is applied, the registers containing the value of f must be unentangled with
any other working register. Otherwise, these registers, which might hinder the
periodicity of the function, have to be taken into account in Simon’s algorithm
and the whole procedure could fail.
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|b〉 Uα |αb〉
2.1. One-to-one mapping.
|0〉
|x〉 |x〉
|x〉
2.2. CNOT gate.
|x〉
|b〉
U
|b〉
|Ub(x)〉
2.3. Controlled Unitary.
Fig. 2. Circuit representation of basic building blocks.
3 Previous works
Previous works have used Simon’s algorithm to break the security of classical
constructions in symmetric cryptography: the Even-Mansour construction and
the 3-round Feistel scheme. We now explain how these attacks work with our
terminology and extend two of the results. First, we show that the attack on
the Feistel scheme can be extended to work with random functions, where the
original analysis held only for random permutations. Second, using our analysis
Simon’s algorithm with approximate promise, we make the number of queries
required to attack the Even-Mansour construction more precise. These obser-
vations have been independently made by Santoli and Schaffner [40]. They use
a slightly different approach, which consists in analyzing the run of Simon’s
algorithm for these specific cases.
3.1 Applications to a three-round Feistel scheme
The Feistel scheme is a classical construction to build a random permutation
out of random functions or random permutations. In a seminal work, Luby and
Rackoff proved that a three-round Feistel scheme is a secure pseudo-random
permutation [33].
A three-round Feistel scheme with input (xL, xR) and output (yL, yR) =
E(xL, xR) is built from three round functions R1, R2, R3 as (see Figure 3):
(u0, v0) = (xL, xR), (ui, vi) = (vi−1 ⊕Ri(ui−1), ui−1), (yL, yR) = (u3, v3).
In order to distinguish a Feistel scheme from a random permutation in a
quantum setting, Kuwakado and Morii [30] consider the case were the Ri are
permutations, and define the following function, with two arbitrary constants
α0 and α1 such that α0 6= α1:
f : {0, 1} × {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n
b, x 7→ yR ⊕ αb, where (yR, yL) = E(αb, x)
f(b, x) = R2(x⊕R1(αb))
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xL xR
R1
R2
R3
yL yR
Fig. 3. Three-round Feis-
tel scheme.
|b〉
|x〉
|0〉
Uα
yR
U−1α |b〉
|x〉
|f(b, x)〉
Fig. 4. Simon’s function for Feistel.
In particular, this f satisfies f(b, x) = f(b⊕ 1, x⊕R1(α0)⊕R1(α1)). Moreover,
f(b′, x′) = f(b, x)⇔ x′ ⊕R1(αb′) = x⊕R1(αb)
⇔
{
x′ ⊕ x = 0 if b′ = b
x′ ⊕ x = R1(α0)⊕ R1(α1) if b′ 6= b
Therefore, the function satisfies Simon’s promise with s = 1 ‖R1(α0) ⊕R1(α1),
and we can recover R1(α0) ⊕ R1(α1) using Simon’s algorithm. This gives a
distinguisher, because Simon’s algorithm applied to a random permutation re-
turns zero with high probability. This can be seen from Theorem 2, using the
fact that with overwhelming probability[18], there is no value t 6= 0 such that
Prx[f(x⊕ t) = f(x)] > 1/2 for a random permutation f .
We can also verify that the value R1(α0)⊕ R1(α1) is correct with two addi-
tional classical queries (yL, yR) = E(α0, x) and (y
′
L, y
′
R) = E(α1, x ⊕ R1(α0) ⊕
R1(α1)) for a random x. If the value is correct, we have yR ⊕ y′R = α0 ⊕ α1.
Note that in their attack, Kuwakado and Morii implicitly assume that the
adversary can query in superposition an oracle that returns solely the left part yL
of the encryption. If the adversary only has access to the complete encryption
oracle E, then a query in superposition would return two entangled registers
containing the left and right parts, respectively. In principle, Simon’s algorithm
requires the register containing the input value to be completely disentangled
from the others.
Feistel scheme with random functions. Kuwakado and Morii [30] analyze
only the case where the round functions Ri are permutations. We now extend
this analysis to random functions Ri. The function f defined above still satisfies
f(b, x) = f(b⊕ 1, x⊕R1(α0)⊕R1(α1)), but it doesn’t satisfy the exact promise
of Simon’s algorithm: there are additional collisions in f , between inputs with
random differences. However, the previous distinguisher is still valid: at the end
of Simon’s algorithm, there exist at least one non-zero value orthogonal to all
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the values y measured at each step: s. This would not be the case with a random
permutation.
Moreover, we can show that ε(f, 1 ‖ s) < 1/2 with overwhelming probability,
so that Simon’s algorithm still recovers 1 ‖ s following Theorem 1. If ε(f, 1 ‖ s) >
1/2, there exists (τ, t) with (τ, t) 6∈ {(0, 0), (1, s)} such that: Pr[f(b, x) = f(b ⊕
τ, x⊕ t)] > 1/2. Assume first that τ = 0, this implies:
Pr[f(0, x) = f(0, x⊕ t)] > 1/2 or Pr[f(1, x) = f(1, x⊕ t)] > 1/2.
Therefore, for some b, Pr[R2(x ⊕ R1(αb)) = R2(x ⊕ t ⊕ R1(αb))] > 1/2, i.e.
Pr[R2(x) = R2(x ⊕ t)] > 1/2. Similarly, if τ = 1, Pr[R2(x ⊕ R1(α0)) = R2(x ⊕
t⊕R1(α1))] > 1/2, i.e. Pr[R2(x) = R2(x⊕ t⊕R1(α0)⊕R1(α1))] > 1/2.
To summarize, if ε(f, 1 ‖ s) > 1/2, there exists u 6= 0 such that Pr[R2(x) =
R2(x ⊕ u)] > 1/2. This only happens with negligible probability for a random
choice of R2 as shown in [18].
3.2 Application to the Even-Mansour construction
The Even-Mansour construction is a simple construction to build a block cipher
from a public permutation [21]. For some permutation P , the cipher is:
Ek1,k2(x) = P (x⊕ k1)⊕ k2.
Even and Mansour have shown that this construction is secure in the random
permutation model, up to 2n/2 queries, where n is the size of the input to P .
x
k1
P
k2
Ek1,k2(x)
Fig. 5. Even-Mansour
scheme.
|0〉
|x〉
|Ek(x)〉
|x〉
|Ek(x)⊕ P (x)〉
|x〉
Ek P
Fig. 6. Simon’s function for Even-Mansour.
However, Kuwakado and Morii [31] have shown that the security of this
construction collapses if an adversary can query an encryption oracle with a
superposition of states. More precisely, they define the following function:
f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n
x 7→ Ek1,k2(x)⊕ P (x) = P (x⊕ k1)⊕ P (x)⊕ k2.
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In particular, f satisfies f(x ⊕ k1) = f(x) (interestingly, the slide with a twist
attack of Biryukov and Wagner[8] uses the same property). However, there are
additional collisions in f between inputs with random differences. As in the at-
tack against the Feistel scheme with random round functions, we use Theorem 1,
to show that Simon’s algorithm recovers k1
5.
We show that ε(f, k1) < 1/2 with overwhelming probability for a random
permutation P , and if ε(f, k1) > 1/2, then there exists a classical attack against
the Even-Mansour scheme. Assume that ε(f, k1) > 1/2, that is, there exists t
with t 6∈ {0, k1} such that Pr[f(x) = f(x⊕ t)] > 1/2, i.e.,
p = Pr[P (x)⊕ P (x ⊕ k1)⊕ P (x⊕ t)⊕ P (x⊕ t⊕ k1) = 0] > 1/2.
This correspond to higher order differential for P with probability 1/2, which
only happens with negligible probability for a random choice of P . In addition,
this would imply the existence of a simple classical attack against the scheme:
1. Query y = Ek1,k2(x) and y
′ = Ek1,k2(x⊕ t)
2. Then y ⊕ y′ = P (x)⊕ P (x⊕ t) with probability at least one half
Therefore, for any instantiation of the Even-Mansour scheme with a fixed P ,
either there exist a classical distinguishing attack (this only happens with negli-
gible probability with a random P ), or Simon’s algorithm successfully recovers
k1. In the second case, the value of k2 can then be recovered from an additional
classical query: k2 = E(x) ⊕ P (x⊕ k1).
In the next sections, we give new applications of Simon’s algorithm, to break
various symmetric cryptography schemes.
4 Application to the LRW construction
We now show a new application of Simon’s algorithm to the LRW construction.
The LRW construction, introduced by Liskov, Rivest and Wagner [32], turns
a block cipher into a tweakable block cipher, i.e. a family of unrelated block
ciphers. The tweakable block cipher is a very useful primitive to build modes for
encryption, authentication, or authenticated encryption. In particular, tweakable
block ciphers and the LRW construction were inspired by the first version of
OCB, and later versions of OCB use the tweakable block ciphers formalism. The
LRW construction uses a (almost) universal hash function h (which is part of
the key), and is defined as (see also Figure 7):
E˜t,k(x) = Ek(x ⊕ h(t))⊕ h(t).
We now show that the LRW construction is not secure in a quantum setting.
We fix two arbitrary tweaks t0, t1, with t0 6= t1, and we define the following
5 Note that Kuwakado and Morii just assume that each step of Simon’s algorithm
gives a random vector orthogonal to k1. Our analysis is more formal and captures
the conditions on P required for the algorithm to be successful.
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Fig. 7. The LRW construction, and efficient instantiations XEX (CCA secure) and XE
(only CPA secure).
function:
f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n
x 7→ E˜t0,k(x) ⊕ E˜t1,k(x)
f(x) = Ek
(
x⊕ h(t0)
)⊕ h(t0)⊕ Ek(x⊕ h(t1))⊕ h(t1).
Given a superposition access to an oracle for an LRW tweakable block cipher,
we can build a circuit implementing this function, using the construction given
in Figure 8. In the circuit, the cryptographic oracle E˜t,k takes two inputs: the
block x to be encrypted and the tweak t. Since the tweak comes out of E˜t,k
unentangled with the other register, we do not represent this output in the
diagram. In practice, the output is forgotten by the attacker.
It is easy to see that this function satisfies f(x) = f(x⊕ s) with s = h(t0)⊕
h(t1). Furthermore, the quantity ε(f, s) = maxt∈{0,1}n\{0,s} Pr[f(x) = f(x⊕t)] is
bounded with overwhelming probability, assuming that Ek behaves as a random
permutation. Indeed if ε(f, s) > 1/2, there exists some t with t 6∈ {0, s} such
that Pr[f(x) = f(x⊕ t)] > 1/2, i.e.,
Pr[Ek
(
x
)⊕ Ek(x⊕ s)⊕ Ek(x⊕ t))⊕ Ek(x⊕ t⊕ s) = 0] > 1/2
This correspond to higher order differential for Ek with probability 1/2, which
only happens with negligible probability for a random permutation. Therefore,
if E is a pseudo-random permutation family, ε(f, s) ≤ 1/2 with overwhelming
probability, and running Simon’s algorithm with the function f returns h(t0)⊕
h(t1). The assumption that E behaves as a PRP family is required for the security
proof of LRW, so it is reasonable to make the same assumption in an attack. More
concretely, a block cipher with a higher order differential with probability 1/2
as seen above would probably be broken by classical attacks. The attack is not
immediate because the differential can depend on the key, but it would seem to
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indicate a structural weakness. In the following sections, some attacks can also
be mounted using Theorem 2 without any assumptions on E.
In any case, there exist at least one non-zero value orthogonal to all the
values y measured during Simon’s algorithm: s. This would not be the case if f
is a random function, which gives a distinguisher between the LRW construction
and an ideal tweakable block cipher with O(n) quantum queries to E˜.
In practice, most instantiations of LRW use a finite field multiplication to
define the universal hash function h, with a secret offset L (usually computed as
L = Ek(0)). Two popular constructions are:
– h(t) = γ(t) · L, used in OCB1 [39], OCB3 [29] and PMAC [10], with a Gray
encoding γ of t,
– h(t) = 2t · L, the XEX construction, used in OCB2 [38].
In both cases, we can recover L from the value h(t0)⊕ h(t1) given by the attack.
This attack is important, because many recent modes of operation are in-
spired by the LRW construction, and the XE and XEX instantiations, such as
CAESAR candidates AEZ [24], COPA [4], OCB [29], OTR [36], Minalpher [41],
OMD [17], and POET [1]. We will see in the next section that variants of this
attack can be applied to each of these modes.
|0〉
|x〉
Ut
|0〉
E˜t0,k
|1〉 Ut
E˜t1,k
|f(x)〉
|x〉
Fig. 8. Simon’s function for LRW.
5 Application to block cipher modes of operations
We now give new applications of Simon’s algorithm to the security of block cipher
modes of operations. In particular, we show how to break the most popular
and widely used block-cipher based MACs, and message authentication schemes:
CBC-MAC (including variants such as XCBC [9], OMAC [25], and CMAC [20]),
GMAC [35], PMAC [10], GCM [35] and OCB [29]. We also show attacks against
several CAESAR candidates. In each case, the mode is proven secure up to 2n/2
in the classical setting, but we show how, by a reduction to Simon’s problem,
forgery attacks can be performed with superposition queries at a cost of O(n).
Notations and preliminaries. We consider a block cipher Ek, acting on
blocks of length n, where the subscript k denotes the key. For simplicity, we
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only describe the modes with full-block messages, the attacks can trivially be ex-
tended to the more general modes with arbitrary inputs. In general, we consider
a message M divided into ℓ n-bits block: M = m1 ‖ . . . ‖mℓ. We also assume
that the MAC is not truncated, i.e. the output size is n bits. In most cases, the
attacks can be adapted to truncated MACS.
5.1 Deterministic MACs: CBC-MAC and PMAC
We start with deterministic Message Authentication Codes, or MACs. A MAC
is used to guarantee the authenticity of messages, and should be immune against
forgery attacks. The standard security model is that it should be hard to forge
a message with a valid tag, even given access to an oracle that computes the
MAC of any chosen message (of course the forged message must not have been
queried to the oracle).
To translate this security notion to the quantum setting, we assume that the
adversary is given an oracle that takes a quantum superposition of messages as
input, and computes the superposition of the corresponding MAC.
CBC-MAC. CBC-MAC is one of the first MAC constructions, inspired by the
CBC encryption mode. Since the basic CBC-MAC is only secure when the queries
are prefix-free, there are many variants of CBC-MAC to provide security for
arbitrary messages. In the following we describe the Encrypted-CBC-MAC vari-
ant [5], using two keys k and k′, but the attack can be easily adapted to other
variants [9,25,20]. On a messageM = m1 ‖ . . .‖mℓ, CBC-MAC is defined as (see
Figure 9):
x0 = 0 xi = Ek(xi−1 ⊕mi) CBC-MAC(M) = Ek′(xℓ)
0
m1
Ek
m2
Ek
m3
Ek Ek′ τ
Fig. 9. Encrypt-last-block CBC-MAC.
CBC-MAC is standardized and widely used. It has been proved to be secure
up to the birthday bound [5], assuming that the block cipher is indistinguishable
from a random permutation.
Attack. We can build a powerful forgery attack on CBC-MAC with very low
complexity using superposition queries. We fix two arbitrary message blocks
α0, α1, with α0 6= α1, and we define the following function:
f : {0, 1} × {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n
b, x 7→ CBC-MAC(αb ‖ x) = Ek′
(
Ek
(
x⊕ Ek(αb)
))
.
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The function f can be computed with a single call to the cryptographic oracle,
and we can build a quantum circuit for f given a black box quantum circuit
for CBC-MACk. Moreover, f satisfies the promise of Simon’s problem with s =
1 ‖ Ek(α0)⊕ Ek(α1):
f(0, x) = Ek′ (Ek(x⊕ Ek(α1))),
f(1, x) = Ek′ (Ek(x⊕ Ek(α0))),
f(b, x) = f(b⊕ 1, x⊕ Ek(α0)⊕ Ek(α1)).
More precisely:
f(b′, x′) = f(b, x)⇔ x⊕ Ek(αb) = x′ ⊕ Ek(αb′)
⇔
{
x′ ⊕ x = 0 if b′ = b
x′ ⊕ x = Ek(α0)⊕ Ek(α1) if b′ 6= b
Therefore, an application of Simon’s algorithm returns Ek(α0) ⊕ Ek(α1). This
allows to forge messages easily:
1. Query the tag of α0 ‖m1 for an arbitrary block m1;
2. The same tag is valid for α1 ‖m1 ⊕ Ek(α0)⊕ Ek(α1).
In order to break the formal notion of EUF-qCMA security, we must produce
q + 1 valid tags with only q queries to the oracle. Let q′ = O(n) denote the
number of of quantum queries made to learn Ek(α0)⊕Ek(α1). The attacker will
repeats the forgery step step q′+1 times, in order to produce 2(q′+1) messages
with valid tags, after a total of 2q′ + 1 classical and quantum queries to the
cryptographic oracle. Therefore, CBC-MAC is broken by a quantum existential
forgery attack.
After some exchange at early stages of the work, an extension of this forgery
attack has been found by Santoli and Schaffner [40]. Its main advantage is to
handle oracles that accept input of fixed length, while our attack works for
oracles accepting messages of variable length.
PMAC. PMAC is a parallelizable block-cipher based MAC designed by Rog-
way [38]. PMAC is based on the XE construction: the construction uses secret
offsets ∆i derived from the secret key to turn the block cipher into a tweakable
block cipher. More precisely, the PMAC algorithm is defined as
ci = Ek(mi ⊕∆i) PMAC(M) = E∗k
(
mℓ ⊕
∑
ci
)
where E∗ is a tweaked variant of E. We omit the generation of the secret offsets
because they are irrelevant to our attack.
First attack. When PMAC is used with two-block messages, it has the same
structure as CBC-MAC: PMAC(m1 ‖m2) = E∗k(m2 ⊕Ek(m1 ⊕∆0)). Therefore
we can use the attack of the previous section to recover Ek(α0) ⊕ Ek(α1) for
arbitrary values of α0 and α1. Again, this leads to a simple forgery attack. First,
query the tag of α0 ‖ m1 ‖ m2 for arbitrary blocks m1, m2. The same tag is
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valid for α1 ‖m1 ‖ m2 ⊕ Ek(α0) ⊕ Ek(α1). As for CBC-MAC, these two steps
can be repeated t + 1 times, where t is the number of quantum queries issued.
The adversary then produces 2(t + 1) messages after only 2t+ 1 queries to the
cryptographic oracle.
Second attack. We can also build another forgery attack on PMAC where we
recover the difference between two offsets ∆i, following the attack against LRW
given in Section 4. More precisely, we use the following function:
f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n
m 7→ PMAC(m ‖m ‖ 0n) = E∗k (Ek(m⊕∆0)⊕ Ek(m⊕∆1)) .
In particular, it satisfies f(m ⊕ s) = f(m) with s = ∆0 ⊕∆1. Furthermore, we
can show that ε(f, s) ≤ 1/2 when E is a good block cipher6, and we can apply
Simon’s algorithm to recover ∆0⊕∆1. This allows to create forgeries as follows:
1. Query the tag of m1 ‖m1 for an arbitrary block m1;
2. The same tag is valid for m1 ⊕∆0 ⊕∆1 ‖m1 ⊕∆0 ⊕∆1.
As mentioned in Section 4, the offsets in PMAC are defined as ∆i = γ(i) ·L,
with L = Ek(0) and γ a Gray encoding. This allows to recover L from ∆0 ⊕∆1,
as L = (∆0⊕∆1) · (γ(0)⊕ γ(1))−1. Then we can compute all the values ∆i, and
forge arbitrary messages.
We can also mount an attack without any assumption on ε(f, s), using Theo-
rem 2. Indeed, with a proper choice of parameters, Simon’s algorithm will return
a value t 6= 0 that satisfies Prx[f(x ⊕ t) = f(x)] ≥ 1/2. This value is not nec-
essarily equal to s, but it can also be used to create forgeries in the same way,
with success probability at least 1/2.
|b〉 Uα
|x〉
|0〉
C
B
C
-M
A
C
U−1α |b〉
|x〉
|f(b, x)〉
Fig. 10. Simon’s function for CBC-
MAC.
|m〉
|0〉
|0〉
|0〉
P
M
A
C
|m〉
|0〉
|0〉
|f(b, x)〉
Fig. 11. Simon’s function for the
second attack against PMAC.
6 Since this attack is just a special case of the LRW attack of Section 4, we don’t
repeat the detailed proof.
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5.2 Randomized MAC: GMAC
GMAC is the underlying MAC of the widely used GCM standard, designed by
McGrew and Viega [35], and standardized by NIST. GMAC follows the Carter-
Wegman construction [16]: it is built from a universal hash function, using poly-
nomial evaluation in a Galois field. As opposed to the constructions of the previ-
ous sections, GMAC is a randomized MAC; it requires a second input N , which
must be non-repeating (a nonce). GMAC is essentially defined as:
GMAC(N,M) = GHASH(M ‖ len(M))⊕ Ek(N ||1)
GHASH(M) =
len(M)∑
i=1
mi ·H len(M)−i+1 withH = Ek(0),
where len(M) is the length of M .
0
m1
⊙H
m2
⊙H
len(M)
⊙H
Ek
N ‖ 1
τ
Fig. 12. GMAC
Attack. When the polynomial is evaluated with Horner’s rule, the structure of
GMAC is similar to that of CBC-MAC (see Figure 12). For a two-block message,
we have GMAC(m1 ‖m2) =
(
(m1 ·H)⊕m2
) ·H ⊕Ek(N ‖ 1). Therefore, we us
the same f as in the CBC-MAC attack, with fixed blocks α0 and α1:
fN : {0, 1} × {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n
b, x 7→ GMAC(N,αb ‖ x) = αb ·H2 ⊕ x ·H ⊕ Ek(N ||1).
In particular, we have:
f(b′, x′) = f(b, x)⇔ αb ·H2 ⊕ x ·H = αb′ ·H2 ⊕ x′ ·H
⇔
{
x′ ⊕ x = 0 if b′ = b
x′ ⊕ x = (α0 ⊕ α1) ·H if b′ 6= b
Therefore fN satisfies the promise of Simon’s algorithm with s = 1‖(α0⊕α1) ·H .
Role of the nonce.There is an important caveat regarding the use of the nonce.
In a classical setting, the nonce is chosen by the adversary under the constraint
that it is non-repeating, i.e. the oracle computes N,M 7→ GMAC(N,M). How-
ever, in the quantum setting, we don’t have a clear definition of non-repeating
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if the nonce can be in superposition. To sidestep the issue, we use a weaker se-
curity notion where the nonce is chosen at random by the oracle, rather than
by the adversary (following the IND-qCPA definition of [13]). The oracle is then
M 7→ (r,GMAC(r,M)). If we can break the scheme in this model, the attack
will also be valid with any reasonable CPA security definition.
In this setting we can access the function fN only for a random value of N . In
particular, we cannot apply Simon’s algorithm as is, because this requires O(n)
queries to the same function fN . However, a single step of Simon’s algorithm
requires a single query to the fN function, and returns a vector orthogonal to
s, for any random choice of N . Therefore, we can recover (α0 ⊕ α1) · H after
O(n) steps, even if each step uses a different value of N . Then, we can recover
H easily, and it is easy to generate forgeries when H is known:
1. Query the tag of N,m1 ‖m2 for arbitrary blocks m1, m2 (under a random
nonce N).
2. The same tag is valid for m1 ⊕ 1 ‖m2 ⊕H (with the same nonce N).
As for CBC-MAC, repeating these two steps leads to an existential forgery at-
tack.
5.3 Classical Authenticated Encryption Schemes: GCM and OCB
We now give applications of Simon’s algorithm to break the security of stan-
dardized authenticated encryption modes. The attacks are similar to the attacks
against authentication modes, but these authenticated encryption modes are
nonce-based. Therefore we have to pay special attention to the nonce, as in the
attack against GMAC. In the following, we assume that the nonce is randomly
chosen by the MAC oracle, in order to avoid issues with the definition of non-
repeating nonce in a quantum setting.
Extending MAC attacks to authenticated encryption schemes.We first
present a generic way to apply MAC attacks in the context of an authenticated
encryption scheme. More precisely, we assume that the tag of the authenticated
encryption scheme is computed as f(g(A), h(M,N)), i.e. the authentication of
the associated data A is independent of the nonce N . This is the case in many
practical schemes (e.g. GCM, OCB) for efficiency reasons.
In this setting, we can use a technique similar to our attack against GMAC:
we define a function M 7→ fN (M) for a fixed nonce N , such that for any nonce
N , fN(M) = fN (M⊕∆) for some secret value ∆. Next we use Simon’s algorithm
to recover ∆, where each step of Simon’s algorithm is run with a random nonce,
and returns a vector orthogonal to ∆. Finally, we can recover ∆, and if fN was
carefully built, the knowledge of ∆ is sufficient for a forgery attack.
The CCM mode is a notable exception, where all the computations depend
on the nonce. In particular, there is no obvious way to apply our attacks to
CCM.
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Extending GMAC attack to GCM. GCM is one of the most widely used
authenticated encryption modes, designed by McGrew and Viega [35]. GMAC
is the composition of the counter mode for encryption with GMAC (computed
over the associated data and the ciphertext) for authentication.
In particular, when the message is empty, GCM is just GMAC, and we can use
the attack of the previous section to recover the hash key H . This immediately
allows a forgery attack.
OCB. OCB is another popular authenticated encryption mode, with a very
high efficiency, designed by Rogaway et al. [39,38,29]. Indeed, OCB requires
only ℓ block cipher calls to process an ℓ-block message, while GCM requires ℓ
block cipher calls, and ℓ finite field operations. OCB is build from the LRW
construction discussed in Section 4. OCB takes as input a nonce N , a message
M = m1 ‖ . . .‖mℓ, and associated data A = a1 ‖ . . . a@ , and returns a ciphertext
C = c1 ‖ . . . ‖ cℓ and a tag τ :
ci = Ek(mi ⊕∆Ni )⊕∆Ni , τ = Ek
(
∆′Nℓ ⊕
∑
mi
)
⊕
∑
bi, bi = Ek(ai ⊕∆i).
Extending PMAC attack to OCB. In particular, when the message is empty,
OCB reduces to a randomized variant of PMAC:
OCBk(N, ε,A) = φk(N)⊕
∑
bi, bi = Ek(ai ⊕∆i).
Note that the ∆i values used for the associated data are independent of the
nonce N . Therefore, we can apply the second PMAC attack previously given,
using the following function:
fN : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n
x 7→ OCBk(N, ε, x ‖ x)
fN(x) = Ek(x⊕∆0)⊕ Ek(x⊕∆1)⊕ φk(N)
Again, this is a special case of the LRW attack of Section 4. The family of
functions satisfies fN (a⊕∆0⊕∆1) = fN (a), for anyN , and ε(fN , ∆0⊕∆1) ≤ 1/2
with overwhelming probability if E is a PRP. Therefore we can use the variant
of Simon’s algorithm to recover ∆0⊕∆1. Two messages with valid tags can then
be generated by a single classical queries:
1. Query the authenticated encryption C, τ ofM,a‖a for an arbitrary message
M , and an arbitrary block a (under a random nonce N).
2. C, τ is also a valid authenticated encryption of M,a⊕∆0⊕∆1 ‖a⊕∆0⊕∆1,
with the same nonce N .
Repeating these steps lead again to an existential forgery attack.
Alternative attack against OCB. For some versions of OCB, we can also
mount a different attack targeting the encryption part rather than the authen-
tication part. The goal of this attack is also to recover the secret offsets, but we
20
target the ∆Ni used for the encryption of the message. More precisely, we use
the following function:
fi : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n
m 7→ c1 ⊕ c2,where (c1, c2, τ) = OCBk(N,m ‖m, ε)
fi(m) = Ek(m⊕∆N1 )⊕∆N1 ⊕ Ek(m⊕∆N2 )⊕∆N2
This function satisfies fN (m⊕∆N1 ⊕∆N2 ) = fN (m) and ε(fN , ∆N0 ⊕∆N1 ) ≤ 1/2,
with the same arguments as previously. Moreover, in OCB1 and OCB3, the
offsets are derived as ∆Ni = Φk(N)⊕ γ(i) ·Ek(0) for some function Φ (based on
the block cipher Ek). In particular, ∆
N
1 ⊕∆N2 is independent of N :
∆N1 ⊕∆N2 = (γ(1)⊕ γ(2)) ·Ek(0).
Therefore, we can apply Simon’s algorithm to recover ∆N1 ⊕ ∆N2 . Again, this
leads to a forgery attack, by repeating the following two steps:
1. Query the authenticated encryption c1 ‖ c2, τ of m ‖ m,A for an arbitrary
block m, and arbitrary associated data A (under a random nonce N).
2. c2⊕∆N0 ⊕∆N1 ‖ c1⊕∆N0 ⊕∆N1 , τ is also a valid authenticated encryption of
m⊕∆N0 ⊕∆N1 ‖m⊕∆N0 ⊕∆N1 , A with the same nonce N .
The forgery is valid because we swap the inputs of the first and second block
ciphers. In addition, we have
∑
mi =
∑
m′i, so that the tag is still valid.
5.4 New Authenticated Encryption Schemes: CAESAR Candidates
In this section, we consider recent proposals for authenticated encryption, sub-
mitted to the ongoing CAESAR competition. Secret key cryptography has a long
tradition of competitions: AES and SHA-3 for example, were chosen after the
NIST competitions organized in 1997 and 2007, respectively. The CAESAR com-
petition7 aims at stimulating research on authenticated encryption schemes, and
to define a portfolio of new authenticated encryption schemes. The competition
is currently in the second round, with 29 remaining algorithms.
First, we point out that the attacks of the previous sections can be used to
break several CAESAR candidates:
– CLOC [26] uses CBC-MAC to authenticate the message, and the associated
data is processed independently of the nonce. Therefore, the CBC-MAC
attack can be extended to CLOC8.
– AEZ [24], COPA [4], OTR [36] and POET [1] use a variant of PMAC to
authenticate the associated data. In both cases, the nonce is not used to
process the associated data, so that we can extend the PMAC attack as we
did against OCB9.
7 http://competitions.cr.yp.to/
8 This is not the case for the related mode SILC, because the nonce is processed before
the data in CBC-MAC.
9 Note that AEZ, COPA and POET also claim security when the nonce is misused,
but our attacks are nonce-respecting.
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– The authentication of associated data in OMD [17] and Minalpher [41] are
also variants of PMAC (with a PRF that is not block cipher), and the attack
can be applied.
In the next section, we show how to adapt the PMAC attack to Minalpher
and OMD, since the primitives are different.
Minalpher.Minalpher [41] is a permutation-based CAESAR candidate, where
the permutation is used to build a tweakable block-cipher using the tweakable
Even-Mansour construction. When the message is empty (or fixed), the au-
thentication part of Minalpher is very similar to PMAC. With associated data
A = a1 ‖ . . . a@ , the tag is computed as:
bi = P (ai ⊕∆i)⊕∆i τ = φk
(
N,M, a@ ⊕
@−1∑
i=1
bi
)
∆i = y
i · L′ L′ = P (k ‖ 0)⊕ (k ‖ 0)
where φk is a permutation (we omit the description of φk because it is irrelevant
for our attack). Since the tag is a function of a@⊕
∑
@−1
i=1 bi, we can use the same
attacks as against PMAC. For instance, we define the following function:
fN : {0, 1} × {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n
b, x 7→ Minalpher(N, ε, αb ‖ x) = φk(N, ε, P (αb ⊕∆1)⊕∆1 ⊕ x).
In particular, we have:
fN (b
′, x′) = fN(b, x)⇔ P (αb′ ⊕∆1)⊕ x′ = P (αb ⊕∆1)⊕ x
⇔
{
x′ ⊕ x = 0 if b′ = b
x′ ⊕ x = P (α0 ⊕∆1)⊕ P (α1 ⊕∆1) if b′ 6= b
Since s = P (α0 ⊕ ∆1) ⊕ P (α1 ⊕ ∆1) is independent of N , we can easily apply
Simon’s algorithm to recover s, and generate forgeries.
OMD. OMD [17] is a compression-function-based CAESAR candidate. The in-
ternal primitive is a keyed compression function denoted Fk. Again, when the
message is empty the authentication is very similar to PMAC. With associated
data A = a1 ‖ . . . a@ , the tag is computed as:
bi = Fk(ai ⊕∆i) τ = φk(N,M)⊕
∑
bi
We note that the ∆i used for the associated data do not depend on the nonce.
Therefore we can use the second PMAC attack with the following function:
fN : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n
x 7→ OMD(N, ε, x ‖ x)
fN (x) = φk(N, ε)⊕ Fk(x⊕∆1)⊕ Fk(x ⊕∆2)
This is the same form as seen when extending the PMAC attack to OCB, there-
fore we can apply the same attack to recover s = ∆1⊕∆2 and generate forgeries.
22
6 Simon’s algorithm applied to slide attacks
In this section we show how Simon’s algorithm can be applied to a cryptanalysis
family: slide attacks. In this case, the complexity of the attack drops again ex-
ponentially, from O(2n/2) to O(n) and therefore becomes much more dangerous.
To the best of our knowledge this is the first symmetric cryptanalytic technique
that has an exponential speed-up in the post-quantum world.
The principle of slide attacks In 1999, Wagner and Biryukov introduced the
technique called slide attack [7]. It can be applied to block ciphers made of r
applications of an identical round function R, each one parametrized by the same
key K. The attack works independently of the number of rounds, r. Intuitively,
for the attack to work, R has to be vulnerable to known plaintext attacks.
The attacker collects 2n/2 encryptions of plaintexts. Amongst these couples
of plaintext-ciphertext, with large probability, he gets a “slid” pair, that is, a
pair of couples (P0, C0) and (P1, C1) such that R(P0) = P1. This immediately
implies that R(C0) = C1. For the attack to work, the function R needs to allow
for an efficient recognition of such pairs, which in turns makes the key extraction
from R easy. A trivial application of this attack is the key-alternate cipher with
blocks of n bits, identical subkeys and no round constants. The complexity is then
approximately 2n/2. The speed-up over exhaustive search given by this attack is
then quadratic, similar to the quantum attack based on Grover’s algorithm.
This attack is successful, for example, to break the TREYFER block ci-
pher [46], with a data complexity of 232 and a time complexity of 232+12 = 244
(where 212 is the cost of identifying the slid pair by performing some key guesses).
Comparatively, the cost for an exhaustive search of the key is 264.
Exponential quantum speed-up of slide attacks We consider the attack
represented in Figure 13. The unkeyed round function is denoted P and the
whole encryption function Ek.
P0
K
P
B
K
P1
P . . .
K
P
K
C0
P1
K
P
K
P . . .
K
C0
P
A
K
C1
Fig. 13. Representation of a slid-pair used in a slide attack.
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We define the following function:
f : {0, 1} × {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n
b, x 7→
{
P (Ek(x))⊕ x if b = 0,
Ek(P (x))⊕ x if b = 1.
The slide property shows that all x satisfy P (Ek(x)) ⊕ k = Ek(P (x ⊕ k)). This
implies that f satisfies the promise of Simon’s problem with s = 1 ‖ k:
f(0, x) = P (Ek(x)) ⊕ x = Ek(P (x⊕ k))⊕ k ⊕ x = f(1, x⊕ k).
In order to apply Theorem 1, we bound ε(f, 1‖k), assuming that both Ek◦P and
P ◦Ek are indistinguishable from random permutations. If ε(f, 1‖k) > 1/2, there
exists (τ, t) with (τ, t) 6∈ {(0, 0), (1, k)} such that: Pr[f(b, x) = f(b ⊕ τ, x⊕ t)] >
1/2. Let us assume τ = 0. This implies
Pr[f(0, x) = f(0, x⊕ t)] > 1/2 or Pr[f(1, x) = f(1, x⊕ t)] > 1/2,
which is equivalent to
Pr[P (Ek(x)) = P (Ek(x⊕ t))⊕ t] > 1/2 or Pr[Ek(P (x)) = Ek(P (x⊕ t))⊕ t] > 1/2.
In particular, there is a differential in P ◦Ek or Ek ◦ P with probability 1/2.
Otherwise, τ = 1. This implies
Pr[P (Ek(x))⊕ x = Ek(P (x⊕ t))⊕ x⊕ t] > 1/2
i.e. Pr[Ek(P (x⊕ k))⊕ k = Ek(P (x ⊕ t))⊕ t] > 1/2.
Again, it means there is a differential in Ek ◦ P with probability 1/2.
Finally we conclude that ε(f, 1 ‖ k) ≤ 1/2, unless Ek ◦ P or P ◦ Ek have
differentials with probability 1/2. If Ek behave as a random permutation, Ek ◦P
and P ◦Ek also behave as random permutations, and these differential are only
found with negligible probability. Therefore, we can apply Simon’s algorithm,
following Theorem 1, and recover k.
|b〉
|x〉
|0〉
P
Ek
X
P
X
(P−1)
b
|b〉
|x〉
|f(b, x)〉
Fig. 14. Simon’s function for slide attacks. The X gate is the quantum equivalent of
the NOT gate that flips the qubit |0〉 and |1〉.
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7 Conclusion
We have been able to show that symmetric cryptography is far from ready for
the post quantum world. We have found exponential speed-ups on attacks on
symmetric cryptosystems. In consequence, some cryptosystems that are believed
to be safe in a classical world become vulnerable in a quantum world.
With the speed-up on slide attacks, we provided the first known exponential
quantum speed-up of a classical attack. This attack now becomes very power-
ful. An interesting follow-up would be to seek other such speed-ups of generic
techniques. For authenticated encryption, we have shown that many modes of
operations that are believed to be solid and secure in the classical world, be-
come completely broken in the post-quantum world. More constructions might
be broken following the same ideas.
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A Proof of Theorem 1
The proof of Theorem 1 is based of the following lemma.
Lemma 1. For t ∈ {0, 1}n, consider the function g(x) := 2−n∑y∈t⊥(−1)x·y,
where t⊥ = {y ∈ {0, 1}n s.t. y · t = 0}. for any x, it satisfies
g(x) =
1
2
(δx,0 + δx,t). (2)
Proof. If t = 0 then g(x) =
∑
y∈{0,1}n(−1)x·y = δ(x, 0), which proves the claim.
From now on, assume that t 6= 0. It is straightforward to check that g(0) =
g(t) = 12 because all the terms of the sum are equal to 1 and there are 2
n−1
vectors y orthogonal to t. Since
∑
x∈{0,1}n g(x) = 1, it is sufficient to prove that
g(x) ≥ 0 to establish the claim in the case t 6= 0. For this, decompose g(x) into
two terms:
g(x) =
∑
y∈E0
(−1)x·y −
∑
y∈E1
(−1)x·y = |E0| − |E1|,
where Ei := {y ∈ {0, 1}n s.t. y · x = i and y · y = 0} for i = 0, 1. Simple counting
shows that:
|E0| =

2n−1 if x = 0,
2n−1 if x = t,
2n−2 otherwise.
In particular, |E0| ≥ |E1| which implies that g(x) ≥ 0.
We are now ready to prove Theorem 1. Each call to the main subroutine
of Simon’s algorithm will return a vector ui. If cn calls are made, one obtains
cn vectors u1, . . . , ucn. By construction, f is such that f(x) = f(x ⊕ s) and
consequently, the cn vectors u1, . . . , ucn are all orthogonal to s. The algorithm
is successful provided one can recover the value of s unambiguously, which is the
case if the cn vectors span the (n − 1)-dimensional space orthogonal to s. (Let
us note that if the space is (n − d)-dimensional for some constant d, one can
still recover s efficiently by testing all the vectors orthogonal to the subspace.)
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In other words, the failure probability pfail is
pfail = Pr[dim
(
Span(u1, . . . , un)
) ≤ n− 2]
≤ Pr[∃t ∈ {0, 1}n \ {0, s} s.t.u1 · t = u2 · t = · · · = ucn · t = 0]
≤
∑
t∈{0,1}n\{0,s}
Pr[u1 · t = u2 · t = · · · = ucn · t = 0]
≤
∑
t∈{0,1}n\{0,s}
(
Pr[u1 · t = 0]
)cn
≤ max
t∈{0,1}n\{0,s}
(
2Pr[u1 · t = 0]c
)n
where the second inequality results from the union bound and the third inequality
follows from the fact that the results of the cn subroutines are independent.
In order to establish the theorem, it is now sufficient to show that Pr[u ·t = 0]
is bounded away from 1 for all t, where u is the vector corresponding to the
output of Simon’s subroutine. We will prove that for all t ∈ {0, 1}n \ {0, s}, the
following inequality holds:
Pru[u · t = 0] = 1
2
(
1 + Prx[f(x) = f(x⊕ t)]
) ≤ 1
2
(1 + ε(f, s)) ≤ 1
2
(1 + p0). (3)
In Simon’s algorithm, one can wait until the last step before measuring both
registers. The final state before measurement can be decomposed as:
2−n
∑
x∈{0,1}n
∑
y∈{0,1}n
(−1)x·y|y〉|f(x)〉 =2−n
∑
y∈{0,1}n
s.t. y·t=0
∑
x∈{0,1}n
(−1)x·y|y〉|f(x)〉
+ 2−n
∑
y∈{0,1}n
s.t. y·t=1
∑
x∈{0,1}n
(−1)x·y|y〉|f(x)〉.
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The probability of obtaining u such that u · t = 0 is given by
Pru[u · t = 0] =
∥∥∥2−n ∑
y∈{0,1}n
s.t. y·t=0
|y〉
∑
x∈{0,1}n
(−1)x·y|f(x)〉
∥∥∥2
= 2−2n
∑
y∈{0,1}n
s.t. y·t=0
∑
x,x′∈{0,1}n
(−1)(x⊕x′)·y〈f(x′)|f(x)〉
= 2−2n
∑
x,x′∈{0,1}n
〈f(x′)|f(x)〉
∑
y∈{0,1}n
s.t. y·t=0
(−1)(x⊕x′)·y
= 2−2n
∑
x,x′∈{0,1}n
〈f(x′)|f(x)〉2n−1(δx,x′ + δx′,x⊕t) (4)
= 2−(n+1)
 ∑
x∈{0,1}n
〈f(x)|f(x)〉 +
∑
x∈{0,1}n
〈f(x⊕ t)|f(x)〉
 (5)
=
1
2
[1 + Prx[f(x) = f(x⊕ t)] (6)
where we used Lemma 1 proven in the appendix in Eq. 4, and δx,x′ = 1 if x = x
′
and 0 otherwise.
B Proof of Theorem 2
Let t be a fixed value and pt = Prx[f(x ⊕ t = f(t)]. Following the previous
analysis, the probability that the cn vectors ui are orthogonal to t can be written
as Pr[u1 · t = u2 · t = · · · = ucn · t = 0] =
(
1+pt
2
)cn
.
In particular, we can bound the probability that Simon’s algorithm returns
a value t with pt < p0:
Pr[pt < p0] =
∑
t: pt<p0
(
1 + pt
2
)cn
≤ 2n ×
(
1 + p0
2
)cn
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